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ABSTRACT
After the Revolution of Dignity (2013–2014), the new Ukrainian govern-
ment set out a number of reforms, one of which – and a successful one so 
far – was decentralisation, involving territorial amalgamation and re-allo-
cation of public revenues and outlays in favour of the newly-established 
amalgamated territorial communities (ATCs). This study aims to analyse 
whether decentralisation is supported by the realisation of the budget 
transparency principle. We attempt to fill the gap still existing in the 
research of public sector transparency in Ukraine, concerning the basic 
administrative level, hereby being limited to big cities and regions. The 
authors carried out an assessment of budget transparency in newly-es-
tablished ATCs in four Ukrainian regions by applying a simplified method-
ology (‘snapshot assessment’) involving 11 measures that could be easily 
located on the ATC websites. In order to understand the reasons for a 
particular level of transparency, a polling of ATC heads was undertaken. 
The findings of the study demonstrate that the overall budget transpar-
ency in the newly established ATCs is rather low and subject to signifi-
cant interregional variation. We find that the local officials overstate the 
existing level of budget transparency in their communities and are not 
proactive in their efforts to raise it. The importance of this article lies in 
substantiating the need for making budget transparency a priority for lo-
cal officials, as well as in detailing the activity of the state and the local 
community in this field.
Keywords:	 amalgamated	 territorial	 community,	 decentralisation,	 fiscal	
transparency, Ukraine
JEL: H79, H83, O52
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1 Introduction
Fiscal transparency is considered to be one of the core principles of good 
governance. It refers to making information on how the government raises, 
spends and administers its financial resources publically available. Fiscal trans-
parency is also considered an important instrument to reach effective public 
finance management. It plays a significant role in building market confidence 
and underpinning economic sustainability, fosters government accountabil-
ity and credibility (Alt, 2019). In this way transparency contributes to making 
information in the public administration sector less imperfect and (to some 
extent) solves the principal-agent problem, where the principal is the com-
munity (society) and the government is the agent.
In 1998 the IMF adopted The Code of Good Practice on Fiscal Transparency, 
which delivers the benchmarks in transparency for the national public finance 
sector. Nowadays its improved version, The Code of Fiscal Transparency as of 
2012 (IMF, 2019), presents international standards applied for transparency 
assessment in the national budget system. 75 countries declared that they 
adhere to the Open Government Declaration as of 2011 and have developed 
respective action plans which relate also to local government budget issues.
Budget transparency is especially important for transition countries with no 
longstanding tradition of public sector administration comparable to that in 
countries with market economy and efficient democracy. Low transparency 
could lead to lack of public control over appointed officials and elected politi-
cians, to misuse of public revenues; inefficient money spending may also oc-
cur. Thus, effective realization of the transparency principle is one of the most 
important goals for nations involved in reforming their public administration 
and public finance in order to reach modern standards of governance.
Transparency has been one of the concerns of the Ukrainian government 
since the Revolution of Dignity (2013-2014). These events became a societal 
reflection to non-transparent actions of the previous government, resulting 
in its dismissal in series of mass protest actions. With regard to public finance 
transparency, some progress has been observed since that time. According 
to Open Budget Survey 2017 (IBP, 2018), Ukraine’s Openness Index has dem-
onstrated a positive trend with a score reaching 54 points (46 in 2015). With 
regard to IBP criteria, it could mean that Ukrainian budget transparency is 
still insufficient as society receives a limited amount of budget information. 
Ukraine’s score is located almost in the middle of the range, where the mean 
is 43, nevertheless being ahead of many post-socialist and post-soviet nations.
The achieved progress concerning budget transparency could be associated 
with the reforms initiated in Ukraine since 2014. It is worth pointing out the 
adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On the Openness in Using Public Means” 
(2015) which imposed onto main budget means controllers an obligation to 
upload information on transactions with public moneys to the specially de-
signed governmental website. This law does not contain any specific require-
ments concerning local budget transparency; it relates to all the public bodies, 
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disregarding the specifics of local governments in comparison to the national 
government and its bodies. While information on national government units’ 
budget transactions has really become more open, the same could not be said 
about local authorities. There are massive differences in amount and quality 
of information that is posted in the national portal and in the local authority 
websites: in most cases, a local authority limits the uploaded budget informa-
tion to the annual budget document approved by a local council and a report 
on its execution. Consequently, an active citizen faces significant barriers if 
he/she wants to be knowledgeable on local budget transactions in his/her 
place of dwelling. Of course, a part of local government budgetary informa-
tion is posted on the national official website (www.spending.gov.ua). How-
ever, receiving access to this information is tricky not only for an average citi-
zen, but also for an expert. E.g. in order to find the relevant information, one 
must have a local authority public register number, which is not easy to find 
(as it is usually not posted on the authority’s official website), the same con-
cerns the transaction time period.
We assume that fiscal decentralization occurring in Ukraine increases the 
need for making detailed local budget information publically available, since 
nowadays local authorities assume more spending responsibilities and dis-
pose of significantly higher amounts of public money. Such development, on 
the one hand, increases the need for local authorities’ accountability; and this 
is impossible without having transparent budgets. On the other hand, as Ka-
tarina Ott put it, “while decentralization can complicate the coordination and 
monitoring of budgets nationally, it often creates greater opportunities for 
citizen and local legislature involvement” (Ott, 2006, p. xv). And, not least, be-
ing supported by transparency, decentralization could minimize the level of 
corruption and increase community trust to the local self-government bodies.
Budget transparency is a product of interaction between economic agents 
demanding and supplying budget information. As concerns demand, to these 
agents belong members of respective communities, borrowers, investors, and 
civil society organizations. From a supply side, the stakeholders are local politi-
cians, self-government bodies and utility providers operating with public mon-
eys. Each of the agents mentioned above has a specific motivation concerning 
claiming disclosure of the budgetary information or hiding it. As the demand 
side looks here much less organized and the supply side seems to be reluctant 
to publicize respective information, the national governmental regulations 
concerning transparency look very important for a more or less sufficient re-
alization of the transparency principle at the local level of governance.
All of the aforementioned makes analysis of transparency trends in Ukrainian 
local budgets very topical indeed.
This study intends to assess budget transparency in Ukraine on the grass-
roots level, i.e. within a range of local budgets of newly established amalga-
mated territorial communities (further referred as ATC). No such assessment 
was undertaken in Ukraine before.
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The paper has the following study goals:
– to perform an assessment of transparency level in ATCs within selected 
Ukrainian regions by use of a simplified methodology (‘snapshot asses-
sment’) encompassing 11 indicators merged into a ‘transparency index’ 
(further referred as TI);
– to find out factors affecting the budget transparency level;
– to outline policy proposals concerning raising budget transparency in ATCs.
In order to reach these goals, the paper is structured in the following way: 
firstly, we review the literature concerning budget transparency in local gov-
ernments and the factors affecting it; secondly, we introduce the research 
methodology of this study; thirdly, we analyze the progress in decentraliza-
tion observed in Ukraine since 2014; fourthly, we present the key findings 
concerning transparency in newly-established ATCs; fifthly, we present the 
possible factors affecting transparency; finally, we deliver some recommen-
dations stemming from our study concerning what could be done in order to 
raise budget transparency in ATCs.
2 Literature review
Within the recent years, a range of publications were dedicated to local 
budget transparency analysis. The possibilities of large-scale presentation of 
budget information via the Internet were analyzed in a monograph “Evaluat-
ing Websites and Web Services” (Yannacopoulos et al, 2014) and by Helen 
Darbishire (Darbishire, 2010). The authors of these publications conclude that 
the development of the Internet has contributed to increasing budget trans-
parency by making possible a quick and cheap distribution of information. Lo-
cal authorities exploit this possibility in order to diminish public pressure and 
to change their mode of communication with the citizens.
Nowadays we have a few studies dedicated to local budget transparency as-
sessment with regard to institutional environment in the CEE countries: Ott 
et al (2006, 2018), Andronova et al (2018), Sedmihradska (2015). Recent input 
to analyzing local fiscal transparency in Ukraine is presented in Demydenko 
and Nakonechna (2016), Slukhai et al (Слухай et al, 2019).
Since the 2000s economists have been looking for factors affecting local gov-
ernment budget transparency on top of measuring it. Especially we empha-
size the pioneering studies by American economists (Alt et al, 2002; 2006), 
in which some institutional (political competition, political polarization and 
composition of the state government) and fiscal factors (debt, budget imbal-
ance and size of revenue) as transparency determinants were analyzed. Bas-
ing on panel data from 50 US states for the time period of 30 years, they 
concluded that political competition between the legislative and executive, 
budget surplus or deficit enhance transparency, while real per capita debt a 
has negative impact; also the political dominance of a party has an influence 
on transparency.
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The importance of accounting for such factors as size of municipality, number 
of population, per capita revenues, accounting disclosure was substantiated 
by Styles and Tennyson (2007) basing on analysis of financial reports from the 
US municipalities.
In the last decade, with evolving e-governance, transparency studies have re-
lied mostly on information available on the community, district and region 
websites. On the district level, Bernick et al (2014) showed that such factors 
as appointed county manager, size of county board, number of full-time em-
ployees, requirements to submit an audit report to the federal government, 
unemployment rate, population age, a share of minority residents, heteroge-
neity of a territorial unit are important to understand the difference in fiscal 
information online presentation. Lowatcharin and Menifield (2015) analyzed 
larger district samples from the US Midwest with regard to a broader range of 
different factors (geographic, demographic, socioeconomic, and institutional) 
and found that such factors as district area, population density, percentage of 
minority population, educational attainment, and the council-manager form 
of government had a positive effect on Internet-backed fiscal transparency.
Some authors offered a complex technique to define local transparency de-
terminants. E.g. Gandía and Archidona (2008) offered a transparency index 
calculation methodology basing on 88 measures grouped in five sections; as 
concerns the factors, the authors included public media visibility, internet ac-
cess and citizens’ education. In Gandía et al (2016) the leverage, municipal 
wealth, press and Internet visibility were added. There are economists from 
Spain and Portugal who tried to pinpoint the basic factors affecting transpar-
ency by use of municipality panel data (Albalate, 2012; Caba Pérez et al, 2014; 
Esteller-Moré and Polo Otero, 2012; Guillamon et al, 2011, Tavares and da 
Cruz, 2014, among the others).
To summarize, the approach applied by modern economists concerning local 
fiscal transparency is the following: firstly, to define the transparency meas-
ure (usually an index); then, secondly, to construct a model involving factors 
from the demand and supply sides that are of different institutional, eco-
nomic and financial, social etc. nature; thirdly, to give an interpretation of the 
achieved results. In our paper we will try to follow this path giving the account 
for limitations of the Ukrainian data bases concerning local budgets.
3 Methods
Since recently, assessing local budget transparency has become a real concern 
in Ukraine. Thanks to the activity of international organizations, some work 
concerning local budget transparency has been undertaken. There exist sev-
eral ongoing projects using different methodologies. Basically, they produce 
some transparency ratings for different samples of Ukrainian local budgets.
Since 2014, there has existed a public partnership “For Transparent Budgets” 
(http://probudget.org.ua/) that provides a Ukrainian city budget transparency 
rating formed according to a specific methodology and assessing 205 meas-
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ures by use of 95 criteria. However, this rating is not comprehensive as it in-
cludes only 37 cities out of several hundred existing in Ukraine. According to 
this methodology, transparency assessment requires constant fieldwork of 
several dozens of experts.
A resource offered by the International Center of Perspective Studies with 
support of the Slovak government is called “Regional Budget Transparency 
in Ukraine” (http://transparency.icps.com.ua/) and contains information on 
budgets of 50 cities of regional significance and 22 regions.
There is also the Index of Local Self-Governance Publicness in Ukraine, a re-
source supported by the OPORA civil organization (https://publicityindex.
org/). However, it assesses not the total local budget transparency, but open-
ness, transparency and accountability of some persons (city mayor and the 
council members) by use of a questionnaire containing 210 questions.
At the moment, the Transparent Cities Rating offered by Transparency Inter-
national Ukraine (https://ti-ukraine.org/research/reitynh-prozorosti-100-mist-
ukrainy-2017/) assesses transparency in 100 biggest Ukrainian cities using 91 
measures for 13 spheres and applying the questionnaires; unfortunately, the 
Rating is available only for 2017. This rating does not provide comprehensive 
information on the city budgets while covering all the spheres of local author-
ity competence.
Disregarding lacking representativeness and biases of the ratings mentioned 
above, they all give reasons to assume that the overall transparency level in 
local budgets in Ukraine is quite low.
To sum up, we concede that local budget transparency assessment is making 
only its first steps; all the ongoing studies are not comprehensive enough so 
as to assess budgets of all local units, but only a small fraction of them (mostly 
the biggest cities). Their maintenance and practical application needs resourc-
es, efforts and extensive funding, which is a reason why they all operate with 
international support. We acknowledge that none of them attempted to as-
sess rural community budgets, which comprise an overwhelming share (about 
90 per cent) of self-government units in Ukraine.
This study intends to cover the gap in existing transparency studies per-
formed in Ukraine, aiming to assess local budget transparency within a larger 
range of local budgets, i.e. rural communities. This aim will be reached by ap-
plying a simplified methodology of external budget transparency assessment 
which we call ‘snapshot assessment’. This methodology has some advantages 
in comparison to the ones mentioned above: firstly, there is no need in field-
work requiring extensive efforts and resources (to fill in questionnaires and 
directly observe local government activities); the only thing needed is a local 
government website and the information uploaded there; secondly, the vol-
ume of information to assess transparency is limited here to some core data 
essential for transparency (the selection of 11 measures is justified by domes-
tic experts and heads of local councils); thirdly, the results will be available 
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immediately, without calculations and different weights applied to certain 
measures to achieve a rating or index.
We deliberately concentrate our efforts on the newly established amalgamat-
ed territorial communities, as (i) most rural communities will be merged into 
ATCs by the end of 2020; (ii) they have wider possibilities to open their budg-
et information due to their obligation to maintain own websites that must 
contain budgetary information, (iii) the demand for their budget information 
being presented publicly is much higher in comparison to ordinary rural com-
munities because they deliver much higher possibilities for implementing in-
vestment projects, borrowings and civil society activities.
What presumably permits an adequate assessment of local budget transpar-
ency is a presentation on the official local government webpage the follow-
ing information: a socio-economic development programme of a territory; an 
annual budget draft and comments thereto; an approved annual budget and 
comments thereto; a citizens’ budget; an annual budget execution report; 
quarterly reports on budget execution; information on investment projects in 
progress; a borrowing policy statement; information on borrowings and their 
clearance; reports on execution of budget programs. This list corresponds 
to OBP recommendations and is supported by many Ukrainian experts ques-
tioned about it in course of this study. Basing on an unweighted sum of these 
indicators we get an aggregate TI for each separate ATC.
The selection of blocs of information listed above, considered vital for as-
sessing budget transparency at the local level, was carried out basing on an 
expert opinion survey (about 20 Ukrainian experts in local finance submitted 
their opinion on possible components of the transparency index). The experts 
were also asked to submit their estimation of the overall ATCs transparency 
level and the main factors preconditioning it, as well as what measures should 
be taken to increase local budget transparency. Their generalized opinion was 
used while discussing the findings of our study.
Each item from the list of approved TI components that is presented on the 
official ATC website was awarded one point; an ATC’s total score could reach 
11 as maximum; these measures for all ATCs are, in turn summed up in order 
to reach region totals.
Four regions were selected for our analysis: Chernihiv, Ternopil, Odesa, and 
Zaporizhzhia. They represent different economic, social and cultural patterns 
and varying success achieved in the decentralization process. The total num-
ber of analyzed ATCs reached 175 units, which looked sufficient to make con-
clusions about the overall local budget transparency situation in Ukraine with 
regard to this type of territorial units.
The data for local budget transparency analysis was taken from the MRDU 
official web-resource (https://decentralization.gov.ua/) and the official web-
sites of the ATCs of the respective regions.
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In order to interpret the results achieved and to understand what defines the 
fiscal transparency level, we distributed questionnaires among the ATC heads 
and received 73 responses which allowed us, basing on the preference vector 
method, to make reasonable judgments concerning transparency level per-
ception by those who are responsible for local budget transparency; and the 
main factors affecting an ATC government’s propensity to adhere to budget 
transparency principles.
4 Context
4.1	 The	decentralization	reform	and	instituting	fiscally	
sustainable territorial communities
In April 2014 the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers approved the  Concept of 
Reforming Local Self-Government and Territorial Structure of Power. This 
Concept aimed to change the country’s obsolete administrative-territorial 
structure inherited from the soviet past. Before the current reform started 
the number of territorial communities exceeded 12,000, which meant that 
the average population of a community was far below 5,000 people. Actually, 
only big cities of regional significance had more or less self-sufficient budg-
ets; the vast majority of territorial units were highly dependent on state sup-
port through many types of transfers (mainly unconditional ones). Therefore, 
in order to achieve more fiscally viable territorial units in the basic public ad-
ministration level a strategy of amalgamation was chosen.
According to the document mentioned above, the following major steps to-
wards decentralization were planned: (i) reallocation and strict delineation of 
public functions across governmental levels; (ii) rearranging the administra-
tive and territorial structure of administration (all local communities should 
be in a position to deliver basic public services to its population); (iii) institut-
ing full-range self-governance at the regional and district levels and limiting 
the power of territorial state administration bodies of regional and district 
levels by coordination and supervision over the legal compliance of the sub-
national governments (further referred to as SNG) activities and quality of 
public service delivery; (iv) increasing SNGs’ competence concerning genera-
tion of revenues up to setting rates for local levies. The heart of this reform 
was community empowerment – making the territorial community a key fac-
tor of societal life and a decision-maker with regard to local public good deliv-
ery. The amalgamation of rural communities was considered as a key mecha-
nism of reaching these goals2.
The theory assumes that territorial consolidation has the following reason-
ing: a) economy of scale in public service delivery; b) decreasing the scale of 
spillovers; c) execution of a broader range of public functions by the territorial 
units; d) higher possibility for civil society involvement; e) more intensive local 
economic development (Swianiewicz, 2002, p. 8-10). We assume that all these 
considerations played a role when the reform concept was elaborated.
2 The initial stage of this reform was analyzed by Slukhai (2015). 
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The subsequent Law of Ukraine “On the Voluntary Amalgamation of Terri-
torial Communities” (2015) provided the legal foundations for subnational 
unit consolidation and enabled the launch of the amalgamation process. As 
of February 2019, 878 ATCs were established since the beginning of the re-
form which comprised 4,018 former local councils. Currently about 9 million 
people reside in the ATCs. The consolidation process was scheduled to be fin-
ished by the end of 2020 (see Table 1).
The amalgamation mapping shows a quite uneven process of rural amalga-
mation: some regions in the country’s center (Cherkasy, Kyiv, Poltava, Vin-
nytsia), in the South (Odesa) and the West (Zakarpattia with regional center 
in Uzhhorod) demonstrate very weak progress in amalgamation; many rural 
locations have no plans to amalgamate. All the other regions including those 
affected by the war with Russia (like non-occupied parts of Donetsk and Lu-
hansk regions) demonstrate almost 100 per cent amalgamation. The reasons 
for this regional variation is, firstly, the voluntary character of amalgamation – 
there are no mandatory requirements concerning amalgamation put on local 
communities, it is supported by fiscal incentives in form of earmarked trans-
fers and technical assistance; secondly, the non-proactive position from the 
side of some regional and district authorities which could heavily dampen the 
process (the reason here could be mere unwillingness of administrators at 
the regional and district levels to shift down authority and revenues); thirdly, 
the populations of villages inhabited by compactly living national minorities 
(Gypsies, Hungarians, Romanians, etc., in Zakarpattia; Romanians, Moldovans, 
Bulgarians, etc., in Odesa) with other villages populated by a different nation-
al minority group or with cities that have a mixed population.
Table 1: Rural community amalgamation progress in Ukraine, 2015-2019.
2015 2016 2017 2018
2019 
(est.)
Number of ATCs 159 366 665 806 878
Total population (mln) 1.4 3.2 5.7 8.4 9.0
Total area (1000s, sq. km) 36.9 89.2 166.9 193.0 210.5
Number of communities which formed ATCs 816 1,784 3,181 3,734 4,018
Average ATC population 8,795 8,474 8,464 19,079 9,155
Source: MRDU, 2019.
The Law of Ukraine “On Cooperation of Territorial Communities” established 
the mechanism for dealing with common problems facing ATCs: waste man-
agement and recycling, development of joint infrastructure, etc. By the end 
of 2018 1,262 communities had taken advantage of this mechanism through 
signing 325 inter-community cooperation agreements. In order to foster the 
amalgamation process, the government granted significant financial support 
for regional development and development of infrastructure in ATCs (UAH 
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19.37 billion in 2018). In all regions (except for the territories occupied by 
Russia) the Centers for Local Self-Government Development started their op-
eration with the goal to assist the newly-established local authorities in imple-
menting their development strategies.
The newly-established ATCs became more fiscally viable through receiving 
additional revenue sources; some additional responsibilities were also vested 
on them (among others, architectural supervision and administrative servic-
es, administration of educational establishments and medical infrastructure), 
which enable them to more efficiently foster local economic development 
and cover local public service needs.
Data (see Table 2) demonstrates that subnational governments’ role in mobili-
zation of revenues has steadily diminished through the years in Ukraine. Start-
ing from about 46 per cent at the moment of gaining independence (1991), 
the total subnational share in public revenues (transfers excluded) has actu-
ally halved – it had dropped to about 24 per cent by 2013. Simultaneously, 
the national government gained a much bigger role in subsidizing SNGs and 
making them more dependent on its decisions concerning the financial sup-
port granted. However, once the decentralization reform started, the reverse 
trend has been observed: since 2015, one could see an increase in the total 
revenue share of subnational units (from 18.5 up to 22.6 per cent); this up-
ward trend is especially remarkable for rural SNGs where the amalgamation 
process essentially occurs – their revenue share grew by nearly 50 per cent 
for the time period 2015-2017. According to MoF data, subnational revenues 
more than doubled, being increased by UAH billion 298.4 within the period 
2013-2018. However, it should be mentioned here that SNG dependence on 
intergovernmental transfers remains quite high: 55 per cent of total subna-
tional revenues still are state subventions. It is worth mentioning that these 
results were achieved under very non-favoring circumstances, both political 
and economical. To these belong, in the first line, the Russian aggression and 
occupation of a part of Ukrainian territory that caused significant economic 
losses and put a serious fiscal burden on the Ukrainian nation.
Table 2: Distribution of revenues among Ukrainian governmental levels 
(intergovernmental transfers excluded), per cent
Governmental levels 2000 2010 2014 2015 2016 2017
National 70.9 74.4 77.8 81.5 78.2 77.4
Total subnational 29.1 25.6 22.2 18.5 21.8 22.6
Regional 12.2 8.9 8.5 6.5 7.3 7.8
Cities of regional significance 10.2 11.8 8.8 7.4 8.7 8.7
Districts 4.8 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.6 2.6
Total SNGs of subdistrict level 1.9 2.5 2.8 2.3 3.3 3.4
Source: Own calculations based on Ukrainian Ministry of Finance (MoF) data.
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This revenue sharing trend in favor of SNGs contributed to a change in public 
sector vertical fiscal gap. A gap between revenue capacity and expenditure 
liability of governmental levels (vertical fiscal imbalance) remains quite wide 
in Ukraine, as seen in Figure 1. However, it has demonstrated a downward 
trend since 2016.
Figure 1. Subnational share in total government revenues and expenditures  
in Ukraine (direct fiscal transfers excluded), per cent
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With regard to recent institutional changes in Ukrainian public administration 
sector and soaring revenues and expenditures of rural SNGs, a reasonable 
question arises: to which extent will this development contribute to solving 
one of the fundamental issues of a nation’s public sector – granting budget 
transparency. In order to answer this question, the data of 175 ATCs from 
four regions was analyzed.
4.2	 Budget	transparency	in	amalgamated	territorial	
communities
While approaching local budget transparency, the first thing to look at is the 
existing national legislation that provides the normative base for public fi-
nance transparency. It is important to mention that there is no special legal 
act that sets standards concerning requirements and order in publicizing the 
financial information of ATCs and other territorial units in Ukraine. Some as-
pects concerning transparency and openness in formation and utilization of 
local self-government bodies’ finance are regulated by the legal acts that are 
common for the whole sector of public administration: the national, regional 
and local public administration bodies.
Since 2002, more than 30 legal acts defining the order of access to and open-
ing information on generation, allotment and use of public moneys were 
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adopted. The Budget Code of Ukraine, Article 7, states that one of the im-
portant principles of the Ukrainian budget system is informing the society on 
the national and local budget policy, on the budget process in all levels of 
the budget system. To the recent ones belong the Laws of Ukraine “On Ac-
cess to Public Information”, “On the Openness of Using Public Means” (2015), 
respective regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, as well as stra-
tegic governmental documents. Transparency and openness are listed as ba-
sic principles for community amalgamation. However, building a transparent 
system of local finance is far from easy, but is instead a long-term process 
that foresees not only adopting legal acts, but also creating political and fi-
nancial mechanisms toward the respective results. The local authorities and 
communities must also come to understand that openness and transparency 
comprise a cornerstone for their effective functioning.
The Law “On the Openness of Using Public Means” provides criteria and stand-
ards on information in the budgetary sphere about which society must be 
informed. Concerning local budgets, here belong: amounts of public means 
of spending units and beneficiaries of local budgets, loans backed by the lo-
cal authority guarantee, as well as amounts received by the units belonging 
to the communal property in the course of their economic activity. E.g., the 
spending units must publicly present information on: a) budget assignments 
for the respective budget period (total amount and the budget programme 
crosscut), amounts of budget expenditures funded and budget loans issued 
by the respective authority; b) all signed contracts within the reporting period 
(with details of the contractors, the subject and cost of a contract, amounts of 
goods or services to be delivered, unit price, ongoing payments towards the 
contract, terms of contract), information about previously signed contracts 
with details concerning contract execution and job completion reports; c) to-
tal number of employees’ business travels with associated costs. Local budget 
beneficiaries are obliged to present information on execution of their ongoing 
and previously signed contracts in case the amount exceeds UAH one million.
Local authorities have to promulgate the budget information on a quarterly 
basis and it must remain in open access within a three-year period; local budg-
et beneficiaries have to promulgate respective information within a reporting 
year with the same requirements concerning open access duration. All the 
information on budget transactions has to be uploaded to the single E-data 
web-portal administered by the MoF.
The local authorities and enterprises operating with local government fiscal 
support are responsible for making the information mentioned above pub-
licly available and are subjected to penalties otherwise. The penalties could 
be applied if they did not make information publically available; if they posted 
non-authoritative, non-complete information or did it not in a timely manner. 
Officials could be punished with monetary fines which are defined in Article 
212.3 of the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences.
The Law of Ukraine “On the Voluntarily Amalgamation of Territorial Commu-
nities” also refers to transparency and openness as a key principle of com-
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munity amalgamation; it specially states that making public information on 
the amounts of state fiscal support granted to specific ATCs (as our analysis 
showed, many ATCs limit their budget information by providing the amount 
of state infrastructure building support received).
It should be mentioned that a part of information on ATC state fiscal support 
is published in annexes to the annual Budget Law: they provide information 
on allocation of the medical and basic subventions across ATCs.
From a practical point of view, some steps enhancing local budget transpar-
ency have been undertaken. A MoF “E-Data” project was launched in 2015; 
its main goal was to provide information on public spending of all the public 
sector units including local budgets. All the spending units and local budget 
beneficiaries are obliged to submit electronic information for automatic data 
processing and uploading to this open web-portal. The new requirements 
concerning tenders for public procurement have also become very important 
for making local budgets more transparent. ProZorro – the electronic ten-
der system for public bodies – was introduced after the adoption of the Law 
“On Public Procurement” (2016); from the beginning of 2019 until now the 
value of contracts made through it exceeded UAH trillion 1.77, with the total 
economy for public bodies as a result of bidders’ competition reaching UAH 
billion 52.82 (ProZorro, 2019).
Transparency in ATCs’ budgets is being monitored by the MoF, Ministry for 
Economic Development and Trade, and MRDU. The latter institution is re-
sponsible for maintaining the process of amalgamation and making public the 
information (also budgetary) of the newly-established ATCs.
5 Results
Our analysis has shown that the information concerning regional crosscut 
with regard to establishing new ATCs is quite complete and is regularly (on a 
monthly basis) updated; however, the information on the individual ATCs that 
is posted in their own websites is very fragmented and non-systematic. More 
than half of ATCs do not upload the full information on their budget reve-
nues and outlays, state subventions, loans and borrowings, not to mention 
the other important pieces of financial information. It means that financial 
and budgetary content of their websites is far from complete. That is why it is 
so important to assess the current situation with ATC budget transparency in 
order to find the ways to improve it.
As a result of collecting the information on TI components listed above in Sec-
tion 3, we got a general picture that characterizes the situation with transpar-
ency in all the four regions involved in our study (see Figure 2).
Information presented in Figure 2 gives reason to state that ATCs have insuf-
ficient financial transparency level in all four regions: the average regional TI 
value ranges from 2.1 (Odesa) to 4.0 (Ternopil) which seems quite low. This is 
not the specifics of Ukraine only; as some authors reported, the actual level 
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in information disclosure provided by the local authorities in some countries 
is commonly low, only 20 per cent of them demonstrate satisfactory results 
(Gandia and Archidona, 2008). As one early budget transparency study con-
cluded, there are also significant institutional and legal issues that hamper 
monitoring and controlling budget activities of local governments for both 
the central government and the public, making the demand for budget infor-
mation quite weak (Ott, 2006, p. 21).
Figure 2. Average TIs and values of its components for ATCs in  
four regions of Ukraine
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It also became obvious that (i) the Ukrainian regions vary greatly as concerns 
average TI value for an ATC; (ii) there are spheres where the budgetary in-
formation posted by the ATCs is absolutely inadequate. Especially scarce is 
information provided on borrowings and ongoing investment projects. Partly 
this is due to hardly any borrowings made by ATCs (according to Ukrainian 
legislation, only big cities are allowed to attract loans in the financial markets; 
as we deal here with the mostly rural communities, even amalgamated ones 
are deprived of this right). However, even in rural locations we could observe 
some (even small) investment projects initiated by the community and fund-
ed out of its own resources (like local road construction, building renovations, 
etc.) for which the local council must be accountable and information about 
the costs must be made public. It seems that local authorities in some regions 
are not eager to present information on ongoing progress in budget execu-
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tion (quarterly execution reports are typically absent), as well as on discus-
sions concerning the ATC annual budget. Citizens’ budget is also very weakly 
presented throughout ATCs.
In order to understand what defines TI value in an ATC, we asked the ATC 
heads to fill in a questionnaire that included the following: (a) Your opinion 
on the transparency level in your ATC; (b) Factors working against the trans-
parency level in your ATC; (c) The budget and financial information to be pre-
sented in the ATC’s website; (d) Your view of reasonable actions to raise the 
budget transparency level. The results presented in the next chapter give a 
possible explanation for why the overall transparency level in Ukrainian ATC 
is low.
In order to understand what defines a TI level in a specific community, we 
first tried to follow to apply a correlation analysis with factors belonging to 
three groups – financial, political and socio-cultural ones. A similar approach 
with grouping the factors is presented in many recent studies concerning lo-
cal financial and budgetary transparency (see Guillamón et al, 2011; Stanic, 
2018). We found it difficult to allocate the factors according to the informa-
tion demand and supply (Tavares and Cruz, 2014). As there was no possibility 
to assess panel data because most ATCs in Ukraine have existed for less than 
two years, so we could only use data of the last full budget year (2018). We 
had resulting models in which the explanatory variables expressed about 30 
per cent of the variations, which looks quite low3. However, it should be men-
tioned that this is very typical for the models of this type. In many studies of fi-
nancial and budgetary transparency carried out on data of different countries 
(even with extensive panel data available), the determination coefficients are 
even lower than those achieved in our models (Guillamón et al, 2011, p. 400; 
Ribeira et al, 2017, p. 197; Tavares, 2014). This could be explained by institu-
tional peculiarities of the public sector that could not be easily caught with 
regard to weak possibility to find the adequate cardinal measures for them. 
Nevertheless, we consider these results doubtful; so we decided just to state 
which objective factors are at play while understanding the level of budget 
transparency. These factors could be derived just from the interregional TI 
comparison and common wisdom.
An important objective budget transparency factor is the local government 
size, as many studies cited above suggested. It could be measured differently 
(population, territorial unit area, etc.), but one of the most important meas-
ures here is an absolute amount of local government total revenues. While 
relating TI value with the total amount of ATC budget revenues we observed 
a distinct positive relation among the variables.
Figure 3 illustrates this fact (here we used the data of only two regions, Ter-
nopil and Zaprizhzhia, for year 2018).
3 These models are presented in our NISPAcee Conference paper (Slukhai et al, 2019).
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Figure 3. Relation between TI and calculated total revenues
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The transparency factors evaluated by us (see in detail Slukhai et al, 2019) 
basically are objective ones and could not be easily altered by the local or the 
national government. It could be suggested that a greater local transparency 
could be achieved in line with the progress in constituting the ATC with the 
urban administrative center (especially of regional significance); the extend-
ing political competition could speed up the process, too; but what is most 
significant, extension of local revenues in form of own revenues could con-
tribute. However, all these factors could play their role only if legal require-
ments concerning opening the budget information become much stricter and 
its availability to the public would be granted.
Of course, the factors mentioned above could not fully explain the level of 
transparency in ATCs, so we used questionnaires to achieve a subjective opin-
ion of local administrators concerning this issue. It appeared that about 96 
per cent of respondents are quite satisfied with the current transparency 
level assuming that it is quite high, only about five per cent pointed out that 
transparency level in their community is low or they were not sure about it.
Asked about what hampers transparency, ATC heads indicated possible rea-
sons among which dominated “The ATC stuff is too busy to be occupied with 
making budget information public”; other reasons like stricter legal require-
ments and insufficient community demand for transparency looked to be less 
important (see Figure 4). ATC staff according to their opinion is more or less 
enough skilled to provide information on budget to community and broader 
public.
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Figure 4. Distribution of answers concerning factors affecting budget 
transparency (percentage to the total number of answers to the question)
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We tried to reveal what kind of financial and budget information they are 
ready to make open to the public. In order to assess this we asked them to 
point out which part of the information that we used to calculate TI with the 
‘snap-shot approach’ would be worth presenting publically (see Figure 5).
Figure 5. Percentage of respondents that support uploading specific  
budget information onto their ATC websites
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From this information we could see that almost all the indexes we offer as 
components of transparency assessment found support from the side of the 
ATC heads. Almost 100 per cent of them support uploading to the websites 
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the annual budget draft and reports on its execution. Somewhat less sup-
port is given to information on citizen’s budget, quarterly budget execution 
reports, investment projects and outlays on specific local budget programs 
(around 80 per cent support). Unexpectedly, most ATC heads supported the 
idea of uploading auditing reports to the ATC websites. In total, we conclude 
that most ATC heads are ready to submit the most important pieces of budg-
et and financial information to the broad audience and feel justified to do so.
6 Discussion
Our main finding is that ATCs generally are not keen on making budget infor-
mation publically available. To some extent this finding could be explained by 
the fact that most ATCs had been established quite recently in the course of 
the decentralization reform, so they have still not adjusted to their new status 
by paying more attention to transparency. It should be mentioned that very 
similar findings were reported by researchers who studied budget transparen-
cy in Ukrainian cities. E.g., the Open Society NGO came to conclusion that most 
important information on budget issues in many Ukrainian cities was not up-
loaded to their websites. Hardly any city makes publically available information 
on spending plans of main budget spending units; the quarterly amendments 
to the annual budget have not been explained to the community and have 
been approved without holding public hearings (Відкрите суспільство, 2016).
Though studies on ATCs would be more relevant, there are very few such. 
Thus, the Partnership for Transparent Local Budgets, a Ukrainian NGO, re-
cently carried out a public audit of ATC budget transparency in two Ukrain-
ian regions – Mykolaiv and Kherson (Фонд розвитку міста Миколаїв, 2018). 
Researchers looked for information much in the way we did; that is why their 
findings are quite important to validate our findings. After studying the situ-
ation in 54 amalgamated communities they concluded: ATCs in both regions 
demonstrate lower transparency in comparison to other local governments 
(like urban communities); this conclusion supports our core finding. It was 
pointed out in the report that ATCs do not systematically present the follow-
ing budget information: annual budget document (around 25 per cent did not 
do this), budget programme passports and reports on their execution (only 
1/3 of ATCs presented them), budget execution reports (50 per cent of ATCs 
did not present them). It appeared also that 13 per cent of ATCs do not main-
tain their own websites (which is a much higher percentage than in our study).
Disregarding the overall pitiful situation with ATC transparency, there are 
some (however modest) positive trends in the field. The public partnership 
“For Transparent Budgets” recently pointed out that ATC budget transpar-
ency has improved with regard to official information (e.g. about 90 per cent 
of ATCs publish their annual budgets); however, the level of transparency still 
remains too low as ATC publish only highly limited slices of information; im-
portant information on how the budget is being formed (like budget hearing 
protocols) is usually omitted (Малиняк, 2019).
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A natural question arises: why is the ATC budget transparency level so low? 
We think that an answer could be found in the linkage between transparency 
and accountability. This linkage could be ambiguous due to specifics in insti-
tutional environment (Zuniga 2018); however, transparency is seen as a pre-
condition of accountability because it provides the principal with the ability 
(community members in our case) to observe how the agent (ATC govern-
ment and its head) behaves (Prat 2005). As some researchers argue, transpar-
ency may reinforce horizontal accountability (Mabillard and Zumofen 2015) 
and at the same time enhance the prosecution of corrupt behavior of officials 
(Murphy et al. 2017), thus diminishing corruption at the local level.
Having in mind this relation between transparency and accountability, we may 
approach to our case. In Ukraine the local administrators are not accustomed 
to being accountable, so they have low propensity to disclose budget informa-
tion. In this way they maintain the information asymmetry concerning ATC rev-
enues and expenditures, and the grounds to make them accountable and to 
align their activities with popular demands diminish. This situation has emerged 
historically and is backed by lacking democracy as a fundamental principle of 
social life. But there are more important factors contributing to such state 
of affairs. To these belongs insufficient local fiscal autonomy, among others. 
Disregarding the fact that ATCs are better endowed with revenue sources in 
comparison to the pre-amalgamation period, they still demonstrate a high de-
pendence on the national government (state monetary and tax transfers); the 
true local revenues sources (towards which they have some discretion) com-
prise a low portion (up to 20 per cent to total) of their revenue. Under such cir-
cumstances local administrators subjectively do not feel that they bear strong 
obligations to publicize the budget information for the community because 
they are accountable mostly to the national government, which gives them 
most money to spend. If there is no strong demand for accountability, there is 
no need to be transparent. We assume this also preconditions inconsistency of 
the answers to our questionnaires delivered by the ATC heads.
Although ATC transparency level is generally quite low, it significantly varies 
across the nation; what meets the eye is a big difference in TI average value 
between Ternopil (the West) and other regions involved in our study. We as-
sume that the reason here could be the historical and cultural differentials 
within the nation. ATCs in the West of Ukraine, among them Ternopil, tend 
to be more transparent in comparison to the other regions as they had long-
standing traditions of democratic governance at the local level inherited from 
the past (e.g. many urban communities in the West have had Magdeburg 
rights since the 13th-14th century), whereas those in the other parts of Ukraine 
did not. These traditions were not fully destroyed in the soviet period when 
local self-governance was treated as the remnants of capitalism and doomed 
to be leveled; they revived with the progress in nation-building.
The other point for discussion could be inconsistencies in their perception of 
ATC transparency and factors that affect it. On the one hand, the overwhelm-
ing majority of ATC heads suggested that budget transparency level in their 
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ATCs is quite high, although our objective measuring of TI demonstrated just 
the opposite. It could mean that they overstate (and very significantly) the 
actual level of budget transparency achieved in their communities; barely sev-
eral per cent of respondents admitted that transparency level in their ATC is 
low. It looks like most local officials are fully satisfied with the current situa-
tion as concerns transparency and would not change it.
On the other hand, when asked about what hampers transparency, only 
about one third of respondents suggested that there are no problems with 
budget transparency, which contradicts to their answer to the direct ques-
tion on transparency self-assessment. ATC heads also indicated a number of 
possible reasons diminishing transparency level, which implies: they de facto 
concede to the fact that budget transparency in their ATC is low, but do not 
want to admit it explicitly. Notably, more than half of respondents, when 
asked to indicate the most important reasons which hamper transparency, 
rated as # 1 “staff busyness”. Referring to such factor itself could signalize 
that making budget information public is not considered a priority by the ATC 
staff. The same ambiguity is registered by us with regard to assessing legal 
requirements concerning budget transparency: ATC heads consider they are 
sufficient, which contradicts the objective situation with local budget trans-
parency legislation, as we showed in our recent study (Слухай et al, 2019).
ATC heads perceive the community demand for transparency as high enough. 
However, taking this subjective opinion in earnest could be misleading. It but 
signalizes that ATC heads do not feel enough pressure from community mem-
bers regarding opening budget information, and are comfortable with such a 
state of affairs.
It is worth discussing why local officials approve publicizing budget informa-
tion that is being used in course of this study while calculating TI, simultane-
ously doing just the opposite in the real life. The information obtained by us 
directly from the ATCs’ websites is much more scarce in comparison to what 
the officials think is reasonable to make publically available. This contradic-
tion could be explained in the following way: disregarding the fact that most 
local officials consider it appropriate to make significant slices of budgetary 
information publically available, they experience no significant pressure from 
the national government and civil society organizations concerning raising 
transparency. One thing is to “theoretically” consider the delivery of budget 
and financial information to the local community, but to do it in reality is quite 
another. Higher transparency needs additional efforts which, as we see from 
acknowledging “the staff busyness”, local officials are not eager to undertake 
without external pressure. It actually means they lack the incentive to do so. 
As a result, according to our estimate, the share of ATCs that have a more or 
less complete folder of open financial and budget information (six and more 
indexes out of 11 are available on their websites) does not exceed 13 per 
cent (only 23 out of 175 ATCs in four regions). This measure is very unevenly 
distributed across the four regions studied.
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In a sum, transparency is explicitly acknowledged at the ATC level as a topical 
issue backed by the rising awareness of local officials and community itself. 
However, even if ATC heads took transparency seriously and made some re-
spective efforts, it is uncertain whether this alone would suffice for the de-
sired result – a deeper involvement of the community into budgetary decision 
making. The recent evidence from Romania suggests that even if decisional 
transparency were increased at the local level, it would not automatically lead 
to greater citizens’ involvement in the decision making process (Radu, 2019). 
The same is true for Ukraine: the Ukrainian students emphasized that despite 
slowly growing transparency most ATC community members feel excluded 
from the budget decision making; this leads to disappointment concerning 
the ongoing decentralization process (Малиняк, 2019). That is why more at-
tention should be paid to participatory budgeting and fostering civil society 
institutions in Ukrainian ATCs, which may facilitate both exerting considerable 
pressure on the local bureaucrats concerning revealing important budget in-
formation, and also will facilitate making community members more involved 
into the local budget process.
7 Conclusion
The ongoing decentralization reform in Ukraine makes it necessary to pay 
more attention to financial and budget transparency at the local level. There 
is a great need to assess the transparency at the ATC level in order to under-
stand whether it is sufficient or not, since existing transparency ratings do not 
cover this type of territorial units. We assume that a transparency measure of-
fered in this study (a ‘snap-shot approach’) would be useful in order to quickly 
get an estimate for transparency of a specific ATC. The practical application 
of this approach would permit an estimate of the existing transparency level 
at the lowest level of the Ukrainian budget system.
Our analysis has shown that transparency at the level of the newly-formed 
ATCs in Ukraine is quite low at the moment. ATCs do not derive benefits from 
possibilities opened by digitalization to provide more financial and budget-
ary information to citizens, thus informing them about financial issues insuf-
ficiently. This is, on the one hand, a historic legacy of the soviet time when 
local problems including finance did not play a significant role; on the other 
hand, it is a result of local governments’ low accountability and specific rev-
enue composition with prevailing non-local revenues. ATCs do not utilize the 
new technical possibilities opened by the digital era: as concerns activity in 
the Internet, local governments are far behind their community members.
This fact means that there is a need to create additional institutional precon-
ditions for the budgetary information to be publically available not only at 
the national, but also at the local level. Our study has shown a sizeable gap in 
the need for making local budgetary information public and the real situation 
with budget transparency. That is why the Ukrainian national government 
needs to initiate special efforts to provide local governments with respective 
informational and technical support in re-creating their websites and putting 
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stronger requirements concerning their content. Not less important would 
be pressure exerted on local officials from the side of civil society and the 
community itself to make them more eager to disclose important pieces of 
budgetary and financial information.
One of the results of our study is the conclusion that ATC transparency level 
correlates with the size of local budgets; this could mean that increasing lo-
cal revenues would create an additional incentive for officials to make local 
finances more open to the public. Shifting down public revenues along with 
institutional measures and empowerment of communities could have a seri-
ous effect on local finance transparency.
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